Several forms of social learning rely on the direct or indirect evaluation of the fĳitness of cultural traits. Here we argue, via a simple agent-based model, that payofff uncertainty, that is, the correlation between a trait and the signal used to evaluate its fĳitness, plays a pivotal role in the spread of benefĳicial innovation. More specifĳically, we examine how this correlation afffects the evolutionary dynamics of diffferent forms of social learning and how each form can generate divergent historical trajectories depending on the size of the sample pool. In particular, we demonstrate that social learning by copying the best model is particularly susceptible to a sampling efffect caused by the interaction of payofff uncertainty, the number of models sampled (the sample pool), and the frequency with which a trait is present in the population. As a result, we identify circumstances in which smaller sample pools can act as "cultural incubators" that promote the spread of innovations, while more widespread sampling of the population actually retards the rate of cultural evolution. S ocial learning is the key process underlying the spread of cultural traits in a living population. The last 30 years have seen productive application of models inspired by population biology to specifĳic questions of interest to anthropologists, archaeologists, and ethologists, including what evolutionary "problem" social learning solves (Boyd and
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ocial learning is the key process underlying the spread of cultural traits in a living population. The last 30 years have seen productive application of models inspired by population biology to specifĳic questions of interest to anthropologists, archaeologists, and ethologists, including what evolutionary "problem" social learning solves Richerson 1988, 1995; Perreault 2012; Plotkin and Odling-Smee 1982) , the spread of innovations (Henrich 2001; Steele 2009; Kandler and Steele 2009) , the loss of cultural traits (Henrich 2004) , the efffect of population size on cultural complexity (Shennan 2001; Powell et al. 2009 Powell et al. , 2010 , and the rationality of human decision making (Bentley and Ormerod 2012) . The latter, in particular, points to a convergence of interest with economists interested in bounded rationality, which, although more commonly investigated using the mathematical apparatus of game theory, exhibits population thinking (Boyd and Richerson 2000) in the explicit use of replicator dynamics to explore optimal strategies for copying with payofff uncertainty (Schlag 1998) . In this article we cross-cut some of these established themes by exploring the impact of population size/sampling and payofff uncertainty on the early stages in the spread of innovations. Our fĳindings augment the results of some existing studies (e.g., Baldini 2012 Baldini , 2013 Lake and Crema 2012) but also identify circumstances in which the positive correlation between population size and the rate of cultural evolution (Henrich 2004; Powell et al. 2009 Powell et al. , 2010 Shennan 2001 ) is signifĳicantly modifĳied by the joint efffect of payofff uncertainty and sample pool size. We begin with a brief review of fĳindings from the most immediately relevant recent literature on the value of social learning, the nature of payofff and success-biased social learning, and how it is mediated by payofff uncertainty and population size and/or the way in which the population is sampled.
The Value of Social Learning
The textbook defĳinition of social learning is copying some cultural trait from another individual rather than independently developing it by trial and error. The extent to which copying from others is unambiguously separable from trial and error-also called individual or "asocial" (Laland 2004 )-learning is debated in terms of the underlying psychological mechanisms (Heyes and Plotkin 1989) and may vary by context (Mesoudi et al. 2014) and, indeed, the window of observation, since an individual can potentially copy a trait, modify it, and then pass it on to another individual-so-called guided variation (Boyd and Richerson 1985) . Furthermore, it is now well understood that individual learning and social learning are interdependent at the population level. Evolutionary epistemologists had long surmised that the function of social learning is to bring about adaptive responses to selective pressures over a timescale intermediate between (slow) natural selection and (fast) individual learning (Campbell 1974; Odling-Smee 1983 ; but see Kendal et al. 2009 for a cautionary note), but it was Richerson's (1985, 1988) "costly information hypothesis" that identifĳied the selective benefĳit to individual organisms of social learning: it incurs a lower cost than individual learning, provided that the rate of spatial and temporal variation in the environment is not so great as to render the socially learned information useless. Rogers (1988) subsequently demonstrated, however, that social learning does not increase the average fĳitness of the population as a whole, because imitators are selected against once their lower cost of learning is offfset by the benefĳit of more accurate environmental tracking, in other words, when the fĳitness of the two types is equal. Further analysis (Boyd and Richerson 1995) upheld Rogers's conclusions, with the result that research now focuses on the existence of mixed equilibrium distributions of both individual and social learners (e.g., Kendal et al. 2009; Rendell et al. 2010 ) and on the circumstances under which individuals should engage in social learning (Laland 2004; Kandler and Laland 2013; Kendal et al. 2005 Kendal et al. , 2009 ).
Social Learning and Payoff Signals
Even if benefĳicial social learning requires at least some individual learning, it is nevertheless clear that many behaviors are predominantly acquired by copying (Bandura 1977; Boyd and Richerson 1985) . Laboratory experiments have revealed the extent to which human beings are cognitively predisposed to copy from others (Herrmann et al. 2007) , and the extent to which cultural norms reflect that predisposition has been demonstrated by comparative fĳield studies (e.g., Rice and Feldman 1997; Hewlett et al. 2002) . Furthermore, Henrich (2001) demonstrated that biased social learning that excludes individual trial and error is required to account for the S-shape curves that describe the uptake of the vast majority of well-studied innovations. There has been signifĳicant interest lately in the explanatory power of models based on random social copying (Bentley and Shennan 2005; Bentley and Ormerod 2012) , and we include this in a variant of our model, but our principal interest is forms of social learning in which the selection of a cultural trait from a set of alternatives in a sample pool is biased by direct or indirect (Boyd and Richerson 1985) estimation of its "worth."
Contemporary social learning nomenclature distinguishes "content" bias from "context" bias (Henrich and McElreath 2003) . Content biases arise from the intrinsic properties of a trait, either because learners have a psychological predisposition (either biologically or culturally determined) toward certain kinds of information, or because they engage in "more generalized cost-benefĳit calculation" (Henrich and McElreath 2003: 129) . Recently, Mesoudi (2011: 67) has suggested that all fĳive of the characteristics of successful innovations identifĳied by Rogers (2003) can be considered forms of content bias. Traits are more likely to be adopted if they are (a) advantageous relative to existing traits, (b) compatible with existing traits, (c) simple enough that their use is easily learned, (d) testable so that their advantage can be discerned, and (e) readily observable. Henrich and McElreath's (2003) notion of "cost-benefĳit calculation" and Rogers's (2003) "relative advantage" are both examples of what is elsewhere termed "payofff bias" (Kendal et al. 2009) and is the form of social learning most commonly studied by economists (e.g., Schlag 1998) .
Context biases arise when learners utilize cues in the learning environment as proxies for the "worth" of a trait: either its frequency or the characteristics of those individuals (models) who already possess that trait. Frequency-dependent bias occurs when the probability of an individual copying the most common trait is higher (conformism) or lower (anticonformism) than it would be if they randomly sampled the population of traits. Although frequency-dependent social learning is in itself a low-cost form of learning, it is particularly susceptible to the trade-offf, already discussed above, between low learning cost and the potentially high cost of failure to adequately track the environment (Wakano and Aoki 2007; Kandler and Laland 2013) . The other form of context bias is model-biased social learning, which entails treating the prestige (Henrich and Gil-White 2001) , success (Baldini 2012; Henrich and McElreath 2003) , similarity, or some other property of a potential cultural model as a proxy for the "worth" of a cultural trait that the model possesses.
Although success bias is classifĳied as a context bias because the learner evaluates a trait indirectly via its contribution to the reproductive fĳitness or material well-being of individuals who possess it (Baldini 2012; Henrich and McElreath 2003) , there might be circumstances in which the result would not be very diffferent from direct evaluation of the trait payofff, which is classifĳied as a content bias. Indeed, the structural similarity of the two forms of bias is attested by the fact that the same game-theoretic analysis by Schlag (1998) is cited in both Henrich and McElreath's (2003) discussion of success bias and Kendal et al.'s (2009) discussion of payofff bias; in fact, there are no terms in Schlag's model that would unambiguously diffferentiate the two forms of bias. Perhaps the best way of conceiving what is at stake in the attempt to diffferentiate payofff bias, success bias, and prestige bias is to think in terms of a spectrum in which evaluation of the trait is increasingly prone to false inference about its true worth. Put another way, while all three biases entail paying attention to "payofff signals," they difffer in the likely correlation between the signal and the target trait owing to an increasing number of factors that may contribute to the generation of the payofff signal. Thus, payofff-biased social learning is vulnerable to stochasticity inherent in the use or performance of a trait, while success bias layers on top of this the possibility that the model is systematically better or worse equipped than the learner to use the trait. For example, a hunter might measure the advantage of a given target trait (e.g., the shape of an arrowhead) via the success (e.g., number of prey captured) of its bearer (see Mesoudi and O'Brien 2008a, 2008b ). This will, however, depend on the type of bow used, as well as the hunter's strength, skill, and knowledge of prey species, layered on top of stochastic factors that might equally afffect both learner and model, such as the availability of the prey and sheer luck. All these factors will contribute to the payofff signal, such that two hunters with identical arrowheads will capture diffferent numbers of prey. Prestige bias renders evaluation of the trait even more indirect because learners defer evaluation of the success of the model to others (Henrich and Gil-White 2001; Atkisson et al. 2012) . For this reason, in our model we do not explicitly diffferentiate between payofff bias and success bias, preferring instead to focus on the magnitude of what, following Baldini (2012) , Schlag (1998) , and others, we simply label "payofff uncertainty."
The Eff ect of Payoff Uncertainty
Payofff uncertainty arises when the payofff signal is noisy, which may be because of inherent stochasticity and/or because the signal is also a function of the context in which it was generated, for example other, cultural and biological traits possessed by the model, or the environment where the trait manifests. A number of studies have modeled payofff uncertainty by assuming that a given cultural trait g generates a payofff signal p drawn from a parametric probability distribution f(p), such that the variance can be regarded as a measure of the correlation between the signal and the target trait. Boyd and Richerson (1995) adopted a variant of this approach in a model designed to explore whether copying can increase the average fĳit-ness of learners by allowing individuals to learn more selectively in a changing environment. They modeled payofff uncertainty in the result of individual-rather than social-learning, such that the observed diffference between the payofff of each of two traits is a normal random variable. In these circumstances learners can ensure greater accuracy by insisting on a greater diffference between the observed payofffs before adopting the trait with the higher apparent payofff, but this will also result in more cases where the diffference threshold is not met and so the result of their individual learning is indeterminate, in which case they copy a randomly chosen individual. What Boyd and Richerson found was that the average fĳitness of a population at equilibrium in terms of the frequency of copying could be higher than that of a population of learners who do not copy, but only for particular probabilities of environmental change. Boyd and Richerson's (1995) model employed unbiased social learning, but more recently Kendal et al. (2009) described a model in which increasing the payofff associated with the novel trait allowed payofff-biased social learning to evolve in environments characterized by a higher probability of change. Although, as Baldini (2012) notes, Kendal et al.'s model of payofff is not stochastic, there is nevertheless a sense in which the relative payofff of the two traits is at least a partial measure of the strength of the payofff signal. Baldini's (2012) own model of the evolution of success bias does employ stochastic payofffs, such that the successes associated with the two traits are independently and normally distributed. Baldini demonstrated that if the measure of success used by social learners is also that upon which natural selection acts to alter the frequency of social learning strategies, then increasing the strength of selection favors greater reliance on success bias since it efffectively also increases the strength of the payofff signal by better diffferentiating the average payofffs of the competing traits. Baldini's (2012) model of success bias assumes that the learner pays attention to the mean payofff of all the sampled models possessing each unique cultural trait, although the extent to which the learner actually favors higher mean payofffs is parameterized. This is a natural choice for a model extended to explore the evolution of success bias when the payofff signal is also that upon which natural selection acts, but as he concedes, it is not the only possible success-biased learning rule. Other possibilities include copying the most successful model (copy-the-best), copying a model that is more successful than the learner (copy-if-better), and copying with a probability that is proportional to how much more successful the model is relative to the learner (copy-proportionally) (Laland 2004) .
The copy-the-best and copy-if-better rules both sufffer from an inability to diffferentiate between "lucky and certain (or highly probable) payofffs" (Schlag 1998: 142) . Indeed, Baldini (2013) has shown how a social learning strategy based on copying the best individual (Schlag 1999; Apesteguia et al. 2007) can occasionally lead to the spread of suboptimal traits if trait payofff distributions overlap but the variance of the payofff is higher for the suboptimal variant. Furthermore, Lake and Crema (2012) have demonstrated that even if the variances are equal, payofff uncertainty can result in copy-the-best learning failing to identify a superior trait if it is rare, simply because the rarer the superior trait is, the more likely that at least one model possessing the inferior trait will have obtained a higher payofff. It turns out that this sampling efffect reduces the optimal amount of payofff-biased copy-the-best social learning when there is payofff uncertainty because it causes the early loss of innovations, although Lake and Crema go on to suggest (but did not formally explore) that this efffect is also a function of the fraction of the total population of potential models that is actually sampled (the size of the "sample pool").
Copy-proportionally serves to mitigate false inferences arising from the "lucky" realization of improbable payofffs (Schlag 1998) , as does copying the best average payofff of each cultural variant (as per Baldini 2012; see also Schlag 1999) . The latter "copy-the-best-average" algorithm is not afffected by the diffference in payofff variance as long as the sampling is truly random such that models with higher payofff are no more likely to be used to evaluate the average payofff of each variant than are other models. Although success-biased rules by which learners sample multiple models and then average the payofffs associated with competing traits have the advantage of suppressing false inference from improbable payofffs, Baldini (2012) has demonstrated that-perhaps counterintuitively-they are also biased toward rare traits, with the efffect that they can perform less well than unbiased learning when the optimal trait is common. Baldini observes that the bias toward rare traits results from the fact that, by considering the average payofff of each variant, the choice between them is efffectively made on the basis of only one observation per variant. Thus, for example, if trait A is twice as frequent as trait B, but both have the same payofff distributions, then the probability of choosing between them on the basis of their average payofffs is nevertheless close to 0.5; consequently, the rarer trait B will be chosen with greater probability than its frequency, thus altering the trait distribution in favor of the rarer trait.
The Eff ect of Population Size
The efffect of population size on cultural evolution resulting from payofff/success bias has been formally modeled in several studies (Henrich 2004; Powell et al. 2009 Powell et al. , 2010 Shennan 2001) , with the general conclusion that larger populations promote cultural evolution by accelerating adaptive change and/or permitting the spread of more complex (harder to learn) cultural traits. A recent social learning experiment by Derex et al. (2013) claims to provide empirical support for the positive effect on cultural evolution of increasing group size, although Andersson and Read (2014) have disputed this, pointing out that the experimental result that larger groups produced complex artifacts more frequently than smaller groups could simply be a sampling efffect.
Shennan (2001) presented two models of the innovation and spread of fĳitness-enhancing craft skills in diffferent-size populations. In both cases he modeled the fĳitness of an individual as the multiplicative sum of the states of each of a fĳixed number of craft attributes possessed by that individual. The states of these individual craft attributes could be altered by innovation, such that most innovations have relatively little efffect but some have a signifĳicant efffect (ibid.: 6-7). In the fĳirst model craft attributes are passed vertically from parent to offfspring, so that change in the frequency of any given attribute state is a function of the diffferential reproduction of the individuals who possess it and whose fĳitness is partially dependent upon it. The second model added oblique cultural transmission such that individuals probabilistically acquire attribute states either from their same-sex parent or from a pool of k randomly chosen cultural models. If k = 1, social learning is efffectively unbiased transmission, but if k > 1, the individual copies the most attractive individual among the k models, thus introducing a copy-the-best learning rule, albeit one that does not appear to include any evaluation of whether the model is actually better than the individual who is copying. This cultural transmission process occurs on a per-attribute basis, such that the most attractive individual among the k models is chosen with respect to the trait in question (ibid.: 10) . Using what he considered realistic parameters for hunter-gatherers, Shennan (2001) found that increasing the population size increased the longterm geometric mean fĳitness of the population, with the efffect most pronounced for smaller sizes and less so for larger population sizes; this was true for both models. The efffect of oblique transmission was to increase the absolute geometric mean fĳitness for any given population size (at least at the innovation rate for which explicit comparison is provided), but the positive efffect of increasing population size decreases as the rate of oblique transmission increases (ibid.: Figure 3 ). Shennan's (2001) broad conclusion about the positive correlation between population size and cultural evolution was supported by Henrich's (2004) model of the social learning of skills. Henrich modeled oblique transmission of skills in which individuals attempt to copy a skill from the most skillful individual in the population, in other words, using a copy-the-best social learning rule. He also analyzed a variant that incorporated a fraction of vertical transmission, but this produced the same qualitative results. Importantly, and central to the claim that his model is "rooted in the cognitive details of social learning and inference" (ibid.: 197), Henrich's model uses the Price equation, thereby explicitly incorporating the efffects of both cultural selection and errors in social learning. In particular, he modeled the latter by drawing the skill level achieved by the learner from a Gumbel distribution, such that the copied skill level is most likely to be lower than the model's skill but there is nevertheless some nonzero probability of it being higher; in other words, Henrich assumed that social learning is mostly imperfect, usually with deleterious consequences, but occasionally produces improvements. By varying the mode, α, and dispersion, β, of the Gumbel distribution, Henrich was able to separately parameterize the difffĳiculty of learning a particular skill (its complexity) and the likelihood that those attempting to copy it make similar or potentially very diffferent errors (in a sense ease or difffĳiculty of innovating). Henrich analyzed the size of the population required for the change in average skill to be positive, that is, for there to be "cumulative adaptive cultural evolution" (ibid.: 202), and found that it depends on the ratio between the difffĳiculty of learning and ease of innovating. Skills that are more complex (large α) and/or more difffĳicult to innovate (low β) are maintained or cumulatively improved only in larger populations.
Shennan's and Henrich's seminal contributions to understanding the importance of population size for cultural evolution have since been extended by Powell et al. (2009 Powell et al. ( , 2010 . Powell and colleagues were motivated by the same anthropological problem that initially motivated Shennan's 2001 model, the so-called explosion of cultural complexity at the European Middle-Upper Paleolithic transition. In order to explore the plausibility of demographic change as a prime driver of this transition, Powell et al. (2009) reimplemented Henrich's 2004 model, albeit with three changes. First, and of least signifĳicance for our purposes, they simplifĳied the treatment of errors in social learning by collapsing α and β into one parameter. Second, they replaced Henrich's simple oblique transmission model with one that they claim better captures a more realistic assumption that "cultural skills and behaviours are often fĳirst, and sometimes only, learned from parents" and also that "identifĳication of the most skilled model will be inaccurate" (Powell et al. 2009: supplementary material) . This entails "vertical" unbiased copying of skills from individuals in the previous generation followed by "oblique" biased copying from individuals in the same generation (ibid.). The bias in the "oblique" copying results from a social learning rule in which each individual attempts to copy a skill from among those models that have a higher skill level than that inherited from the previous generation. The chosen model is selected probabilistically in proportion to the magnitude of the diffference in the model's skill level and that of the learner. Third, Powell and colleagues added spatial structure to the population by dividing it into G groups, each of size N, placed in an environment. Individuals can migrate between groups at a rate that is a function of the density, D, with which the groups are placed in the environment. Powell and colleagues found that increasing the overall population size (a function of G, since N is fĳixed) does promote increased skill complexity, but the efffect is most pronounced for smaller population sizes and is much diminished or even nonexistent for larger population sizes (ibid.: Figure S2 ). In the latter case (G > 50) the principal determinant of population average skill level is the amount of migratory activity. Experiments with a fĳixed and large number of groups demonstrated that the positive efffect of increased intergroup migration on skill level is greater for more complex skills, in the sense that, as skills become harder to learn, increasing the migration rate has an efffect that is the equivalent to greatly increasing the size of a single unstructured population. Although Vaesen (2012) has argued that the assumptions made by Powell et al. mean that their model does not provide a sufffĳiciently severe test of their substantive hypothesis, their results nevertheless extend the set of specifĳic learning rules for which it appears that there is a positive correlation between increasing population size and/or density (see Powell et al. 2009 : Figure S1 ) and the rate at which payofff/success-biased social learning can drive cultural evolution. Furthermore, their study also points to the importance of population structure for this relationship.
Combining Payoff Uncertainty and Sampling Eff ects
We suggested above that payofff uncertainty potentially afffects any form of social learning that makes use of a payofff signal to evaluate the worth of a cultural trait, whether that is content-biased social learning such as payofff-biased learning, or context-biased social learning such as success-or prestige-biased learning. In all these cases a simple stochastic model of payofff can be used to capture the fundamental structural issue, which is the strength of the correlation between the observed payofff signal and the true "worth" of the trait. As we have discussed, several studies employing such a model have demonstrated that payofff bias signifĳi-cantly afffects the optimal amount of social learning in a range of diffferent scenarios. Moreover, it is also now clear that the exact form of the social learning rule matters: copy-the-best can lead to false inferences when payofff uncertainty is high, whereas copy-the-best-average payofff is more robust but favors rare variants.
We have also documented how a separate strand of theoretical modeling has demonstrated that population size and/or the way in which the population is sampled mediates the efffect of payofff/ success-biased learning, and this appears to be true for both copy-the-best and copy-proportionally rules. Deleterious sampling efffects caused by small population sizes are predicted to reduce the rate of adaptive cultural evolution and even lead to cultural trait loss. Larger populations, on the other hand, are predicted to support the social learning of more complex traits even when the learning process is error-prone, and increasing the migration rate in populations broken into subgroups also has this efffect. It has recently been noted, however, that empirical studies do not unambiguously support these theoretical insights (Collard et al. 2013) . There are various possible reasons for this, ranging from the efffect of population size being swamped by other factors, to the empirical studies not adequately measuring interactions as opposed to total (census) population. The possibility that particularly interests us here is that existing models of the efffect of population size/sampling on cultural evolution do not adequately account for the efffect of payofff uncertainty on social learning. This is particularly problematic if Caldwell and Eve (2014) are correct in their supposition that social learning of human technology invariably involves payofff uncertainty because of the spatiotemporal separation of tool manufacture from tool use.
While it is clear from existing studies that both payofff uncertainty and population size/sampling alter the efffect of social learning on cultural evolution, it is striking that all the models reviewed above incorporate one or the other, but not both, so their interaction has not been fully explored. 1 Furthermore, above we noted studies (Baldini 2012; Lake and Crema 2012) that provide reason to think that when payofff is uncertain the efffĳicacy of particular forms of social learning can also be afffected by the relative frequency with which a "better" trait is present in a population. In particular, we have previously demonstrated that a rare better trait can be lost as a result of payofff uncertainty because of a sampling efffect in which, if enough models with the more common inferior trait are sampled, it becomes probable that one of them will have a rare high payofff that is greater than the highest payofff exhibited among the smaller sample of models with the rare but better trait (Lake and Crema 2012) . This efffect suggests to us a mechanism that could reduce the benefĳit of larger population sizes, or of higher migration rates between subgroups, especially when the better trait is rare, as would be the case in the earliest stages of the difffusion of an innovation. In this paper we describe a model designed to explore exactly that possibility and present results confĳirming that there are indeed scenarios in which certain payofff/ success-biased social learning rules are predicted to produce faster rates of cultural evolution in smaller rather than larger populations. Moreover, it seems that smaller communities within populations can act as initial "cultural incubators" that promote the early survival of benefĳicial innovations, and we note the far-reaching signifĳicance of this.
Modeling Cultural Transmission with Uncertain Payoff Signals
We fĳirst describe a model of the cultural transmission of discrete traits whose payofff is variable, such that individuals have imperfect knowledge of the true worth of traits possessed by others in the population. Three variants of this model difffer according to the learning rule employed: random copying (unbiased transmission), copy-if-better, or copy-the-best. We fĳirst comment on aspects of the model and then outline our experimental design.
The Model
Consider a population of N individuals, each possessing a cultural trait g represented by an integer, and a payofff signal p that varies at each time step and is a function of g. We assume that neither g nor p afffects the reproductive fĳitness of the agents (i.e., N is held constant), and that the simulation proceeds synchronically rather than sequentially (i.e., all agents execute each step before the model proceeds to the next step). At each discrete time step t, all individuals undertake the following: , independently reach the same g(t) if they also had the same g(t -1).
As discussed in the introductory remarks, the stochasticity of the payofff signal (σ) is a direct proxy for the correlation between g and p. When σ = 0, there is no uncertainty in the payofff, and agents are assumed to be capable of fully isolating the adaptive performance of a given cultural trait, and hence can correctly identify whether a variant is "better" or the "best," depending on the social learning rule. With increasing values of σ, the correlation declines; consequently, traits with lower g can occasionally be associated with a payofff signal that is higher than that associated with other traits that have higher g.
Random copying (unbiased transmission) provides a benchmark expectation for a comparative assessment of the two social learning rules that incorporate selection. Random copying assumes a copying process in which only the frequencies of the variants determine their probability of adoption (Bentley et al. 2004) . The copy-the-best rule involves a process of selection (the identifĳication of the individual in the sample pool who has the highest payofff, p) and evaluation (comparison of the focal individual's and model's payofff signals) prior to copying. Copy-if-better offfers a compromise between undirected random copying and the strongly directed copy-the-best rule. On the one hand, there is no directed selection of the model (which is picked at random from the sample pool), but on the other hand, copy-if-better retains the element of evaluation in that the model's trait is adopted only if it has a higher payofff, p, than the focal individual's current trait. We noted above that Powell et al. (2009) , doubting the realism of the copy-the-best rule, implemented a form of copy-if-better social learning in which individuals have an opportunity to copy a better skill with a probability proportional to the magnitude of improvement it represents. It could be argued that for Powell et al. the probabilistic copying provides a partial implementation of payofff uncertainty, in the sense that higher skill levels are more likely to be perceived as worth copying; but on the other hand, it does not ultimately capture the uncertainty about which models have higher skills. Our version of copy-if-better allows payofff uncertainty to dictate the accuracy of inference about which models have higher skills and is more weakly directed than Powell et al.'s rule; on the other hand, it should be less susceptible to false inference from rare payofffs than both their rule and the copy-the-best rule.
An important element in our model is the parameter k, the number of individuals in the sample pool. This allows us to relax the assumption that social learning is unconstrained by physical or cognitive constraints (i.e., that cultural transmission is panmictic) since it implies that the sampling capacity of the focal individual is fĳinite, perhaps as a function of cognitive capacity (see Dunbar 1993) or the result of cultural isolation caused by distance (see Premo and Scholnick 2011) . Both Shennan (2001, second model only) and Lake and Crema (2012) parameterized the size of the sample pool, but neither subjected it to systematic exploration, and Shennan was not, in any case, concerned with the efffect of payofff uncertainty. Powell et al.'s (2009) use of discrete groups (subpopulations) connected by migration is analogous to specifying fĳinite sample pools with nonidentical but partially overlapping membership, but again, they were not explicitly concerned with the relationship between sample pool size and payofff uncertainty. The parameter k can be loosely interpreted as the size of the strongly interacting social clique that learn from one another, which potentially varies from the entire population of size N to dyads comprising just two individuals; however, in our formalization we always exclude the focal individual (the one who is learning) from the sample pool, so k can take values from N -1 to 1. In this way our model assumes that focal individuals never attempt to copy from themselves, although they can subsequently evaluate a candidate trait against their own trait (in copy-the-best and copy-if-better social learning). Consequently, model selection and evaluation (the decision to adopt a candidate trait) are explicitly treated as separate parts of the social learning process.
Experimental Design
In this article we present the results of three experiments. The fĳirst explores how diffferent values of σ (uncertainty in the payofff signal), values of k (the size of the sample pool), and social learning rules interact to afffect the earliest stage of benefĳicial innovation. Our specifĳic concern is to establish the probability that a rare benefĳicial innovation is lost from the total population, N, as a result of sampling efffects. We achieve this by assuming that there is one innovator who has a superior trait and that all other individuals in the population share an inferior trait (with lower g and therefore lower mean p). For simplicity we assume that the innovation and the existing trait both have the same payofff variance, σ. In this fĳirst experiment we are not concerned with population sampling, so in all cases k = N -1. In other words, the sample pool is simply the entire population minus the focal individual, and thus by altering k we are efffectively altering the population size. In this way, this fĳirst experiment shares with Shennan (2001) and Henrich (2004) a principal interest in the efffect of overall population size 2 rather than diffferent sampling fractions.
The second and third experiments focus on how diffferent values of σ (uncertainty in the payofff signal), values of k (the size of the sample pool), and social learning rules interact to determine the long-term rate of cultural evolution. The latter is measured as the average value of g after a predefĳined number of time steps. In other words, we seek to identify conditions where, holding constant the rates of innovation (µ) and the amount of improvement (b), we see the fastest spread of benefĳicial cultural traits. Furthermore, in this case we abandon the assumption of panmixia and instead explore the efffect of population sampling. We achieve this by implementing the model as a simple agent-based simulation in which we randomly place the agents in a bounded space and defĳine the sample pool of each focal agent as its k nearest neighbors (see Figure 1) . Thus, when k < N -1 we model some degree of isolation by distance, whereas when k = N -1 we model a panmictic population. Note that modeling the membership of the sample pool as a fĳixed number of neighbors (rather than, say, those falling within some Euclidean search radius) guarantees a fĳixed-size sample pool per agent and, importantly for interpretation of N, no completely isolated population subgroups. In experiment 2 we hold the total population, N, constant and vary k; hence, we are no longer modeling the efffect of population size per se but, rather, the completeness with which the population is sampled. In that regard, this second experiment is closer to some of the experiments conducted by Powell et al. (2009) than it is to the earlier studies of Shennan (2001) and Henrich (2004) , although of course it is diffferent in its very explicit treatment of payofff uncertainty. In experiment 3 we vary both 
Results

Experiment 1: Loss of a Benefi cial Innovation
When the mode of social learning is random copying, we can calculate the probability of the population losing the innovation, P(loss of B), as follows. First, recall that we assume that one individual has innovated a better trait, B, and all other N -1 individuals possess an inferior trait, A. Recall also that we fĳix k = N -1, which means that individuals do not copy themselves. The probability that the population loses B is the product of the probability P(innovator loses B) that the innovator loses B by copying A and the probability P(others do not copy B) that none of the other N -1 individuals copies B from the innovator. Considering each in turn:
• P(innovator loses B) = z, because innovators will always loose B if they engage in unbiased social learning, because all other individuals from which they can learn have trait A; • P(others do not copy B) = (1 -z/k) k , because the probability of any one of the k = N -1 individuals who are not the innovator not copying trait B is 1 -z/k.
It follows that P(loss
This solution does not, however, allow for the possibility that each of the individuals who has trait A might gain B, not by copying it from the innovator but by convergent innovation of their own. Although this possibility might be remote (but perhaps less so for simpler traits), we take a conservative stance by incorporating it: if the innovation is lost even with the possibility of convergence, then the probability of loosing it without convergence would be even higher. Assuming that copying trait B and independently innovating it are not mutually exclusive possibilities and that the probability of convergent innovation is c, then by the law of addition, the probability of any one individual who is not the original innovator acquiring the trait B is z/k + c -cz/k.
Substituting this revised formulation back into our original solution, we fĳind the probability of trait B being lost from the entire population to be
We did not identify an analytical solution for the copy-if-better and copy-the-best models, and hence we solved the probability of innovation loss via simulation.
3 Figure 2 highlights how the three models are afffected by the size of the sample pool, k, and the uncertainty in the payofff signal, σ, assuming that g A = 1, g B = 3, and z = 1. In general terms, the lowest values of P(loss of B) are achieved by copyif-better social learning, while copy-the-best social learning can be better or worse than random copying depending on the degree of payofff uncertainty. Payofff uncertainty is detrimental to the retention of the optimal variants under both copy-the-best and copy-if-better social learning, although the magnitude of its negative efffect is much larger for the former. The relationship between k and P(loss of B) also varies between the three models. Random copying and copy-if-better social learning show a stable relationship (albeit the former has a lower probability of loss when k < ca. 15), while in the case of copy-the-best learning we observe a continuous increase in P(loss of B) as function of k. In other words, random copying and copy-ifbetter social learning are almost unafffected by the size of the sample pool (with the latter minimally afffected by payofff uncertainty), whereas copy-thebest social learning is strongly dependent on both payofff uncertainty and size of sample pool. When we allow for convergent evolution ( Figure 2B ), the deleterious efffect of larger k on copy-the-best social learning is mitigated by the larger number of potential innovators. This leads to a nonlinear relationship between k and P(loss of B), with the highest values of the latter obtained for intermediate values of the former.
Experiments 2 and 3: Spread of Innovation through a Population
The results of the fĳirst experiment suggest that when social learning uses a copy-the-best rule, a decreased correlation between g and its corresponding payofff signal p (i.e., larger σ) can lead to smaller sample pools, k, better supporting the retention of rare, benefĳicial traits. However, small k also implies a smaller chance that a benefĳicial innovation occurs within the social clique (sample) in the fĳirst place. There are thus two contrasting forces: low k promotes the retention of benefĳicial innovations but decreases the probability of such innovations being present in the social clique; high k increases the probability of erroneously selecting suboptimal traits present at higher frequencies but also increases the probability that a benefĳicial innovation is present (and is thus available to be copied) within the social clique. We now explore the balance between these two contrasting forces in a spatially explicit population of N randomly distributed agents, where the sample pool size is determined by the local interaction radius, defĳined as the k nearest neighbors to each focal agent. High values of k allow wider interaction, increasing the probability that a sampled model possesses a benefĳicial mutation, while low values of k produce more localized interaction with a concomitantly lower probability of innovation loss. For experiment 2, we use Latin hypercube sampling (McKay et al. 1979 ) to ensure uniform coverage of a parameter space comprising 30,000 unique combinations for each of the three models, with σ bounded between 0 and 3 and k between 1 and 500, and fĳixing N to 1,000, b and z to 1.0, and µ to 0.005. In all cases we initialized the entire population with g = 0, executing 1,000 time steps and recording the average fĳinal cultural trait value g. Notice that the theoretical maximum of ḡ is In all cases g B = 3 and g A = 1. Probabilities were obtained from 10,000 simulations for each value of k, except for the random copying model. Eff ect of payoff uncertainty (σ) and sample pool size (k) on the rate of cumulative cultural evolution (g -, the average cultural trait value a er 1,000 time steps) for three social learning rules: copythe-best (red), copy-if-better (blue), or random copying (yellow); darker color indicates higher payoff uncertainty within each plot.
1,000, that is, the number of time steps plus the value of g at initialization (0). Figure 3 shows the relationship between the fĳinal average cultural trait, g, and the size of the sample pool (interaction radius), k, for diffferent ranges of payofff uncertainty, σ. For all parameter settings we fĳind that random copying is the slowest social learning strategy, with ḡ ~ 5, which is what we expect given that the rate of innovation was 0.005 and the number of time steps 1,000. As shown in the top left panel of Figure 3 , when σ is close to zero, meaning that payofff uncertainty is low (or, put another way, that the correlation between the payofff signal and the underlying trait is high), copy-thebest is by far the most efffective social learning rule. Under these circumstances both copy-if-better and copy-the-best social learning are positively afffected by k, albeit in diffferent ways. Copy-if-better social learning exhibits a positive correlation with sample pool size only up to k = 20; above this threshold we do not see any increase in the rate of evolution. On the other hand, copy-the-best social learning always benefĳits from increasing sample pool size, and the curve reaches the theoretical maximum of ḡ when k is close to 500. Thus, when payofff uncertainty is low, larger sample pools promote the correct detection of the most successful variants and at the same time ensure the rapid difffusion of these across the entire population.
As payofff uncertainty increases (see consecutive panels in Figure 3 ), the performance of both copy-if-better and copy-the-best social learning deteriorates. In both cases there is an increased chance of accidentally adopting a suboptimal variant. However, in copy-if-better learning the sampling bias introduced by payofff uncertainty afffects only the evaluation stage, and hence its efffect is smaller than in copy-the-best learning, where instead the bias is also present in the selection of the social model. Indeed, the diffference FIGURE 4. Eff ect of payoff uncertainty (σ), sample pool size (k), and census population size (N) on the rate of cumulative cultural evolution (g -, the average cultural trait value a er 1,000 time steps) for copy-the-best and copy-if-better social learning rules.
between the rates of evolution of the two learning strategies decreases with increasing payofff uncertainty, such that once σ > 1.5, copy-if-better social learning actually yields higher ḡ than copy-the-best learning when k is large. In other words, increasing payofff uncertainty decreases the strength of cultural selection more severely with copy-the-best than with copy-if-better social learning. Figure  3 demonstrates how, with copy-the-best social learning, the benefĳicial efffect of a larger sample pool size, k, is counterbalanced by the increased chance of inadvertently copying the trait of an individual that by chance produced a high payofff value despite possessing a suboptimal variant. As a result, when payofff uncertainty increases, a smaller sample pool can, counterintuitively, promote a faster rate of cumulative cultural evolution because the benefĳit of minimizing the risk of accidentally adopting suboptimal cultural traits outweighs the cost of reducing the potential pool of new benefĳi-cial variants.
In experiment 3 we further explored the relationship between census population (N) and sample pool size (k), by running the copy-the-best and copy-if-better models with four settings of σ (0, 0.4, 1.5, and 4) and three settings of N (1,000, 2,000, and 4,000). Comparing consecutive panels in Figure 4 shows that, overall, payofff uncertainty, σ, is still the major driver of change in the rate of cumulative cultural evolution, g, for both learning strategies. Census population size, N, is the second best predictor for the copy-if-better model, but in the case of copy-the-best social learning the relative efffect of N and k on ḡ is a function of σ. When payofff uncertainty is low, increasing the population size, N, the sample pool size, k, or both increases the rate of cultural evolution. In contrast, when payofff uncertainty is high, increasing the population size always increases the rate of evolution for any given sample pool size, but the efffect of increasing the latter can be sufffĳiciently deleterious that it nullifĳies the advantage of increased population size.
Discussion and Conclusion
In our introductory remarks we reviewed some of the extensive literature concerning the impact of diffferent social learning rules and population size on cumulative cultural evolution. We then set out and reported the results of a model designed to investigate the less explored question of how payofff uncertainty and population size/sampling might interact to promote or retard the social learning of initially rare innovations. Here we comment on the implications of our results in relation to the existing literature.
Benefĳicial traits often fail to spread through a population as a result of key events occurring at the earliest stage of adoption. The decision making of early adopters can potentially drive long-term evolutionary trajectories, often leading to the permanence of suboptimal traits and the loss of more benefĳicial innovations. This is particularly likely when it is difffĳicult to measure the value of each variant and, consequently, the comparative advantage of a novel trait is hard to evaluate (Rogers 2003) . The increased learning costs of cumulative knowledge (Mesoudi 2011 ), a decreased investment in individual learning (Whitehead and Richerson 2009) , and early chance events (Greve and Seidel 2014) can all lead to the retention of suboptimal traits and slowdown in the rate of cultural evolution. Our results suggest that a copy-the-best social learning strategy centered on the imitation of a smaller subset of highly visible, successful individuals can also generate a decrease in the rate of cumulative cultural evolution when there is payofff uncertainty. The dynamics we demonstrate closely resemble what economists refer to as survivorship bias (Elton et al. 1996) , a particular form of sampling bias where only highly positive payofff signals are considered, hindering the correct evaluation of the full spectrum of a cultural trait. Indeed, our simulation experiments show that when payofff is highly uncertain and the sample pool of potential cultural models is larger, there is bias favoring the retention of suboptimal traits present at higher frequency. As a direct consequence, newly introduced variants, which will always initially have a lower frequency, are at an intrinsic disadvantage relative to traits that are common and whose value is measured via payofff signals that have high variance.
We noted in our introductory remarks that payofff-biased, success-biased, and prestige-biased social learning all entail paying attention to payofff signals, but they difffer in the likely correlation between the signal and the target trait owing to an increasing number of factors that may contribute to the generation of the payofff signal. The shape of the payofff distribution we examined here assumes an additive interaction of its generative constituents (i.e., the target trait and everything else contributing to the payofff signal), but a multiplicative interaction yielding a skewed distribution (Limpert et al. 2001 ) is also possible. In this scenario the correlation between the target trait and its payofff signal would be reduced and the association between the two even harder to disentangle. Although there are good reasons to believe that in many behavioral domains the payofff signal is normally distributed (Frank 2009 ), some empirical data on prestige and success do indeed show a positively skewed distribution, for example, income (Drăgulescu and Yakovenko 2001) and number of academic citations (Gupta et al. 2005) . We suspect that such asymmetric and right-tailed payofff distributions would further strengthen the efffect of survivorship bias, promoting the retention of suboptimal traits even more frequently than already observed with our model based on normally distributed payofffs. For this reason, we expect success-biased and prestige-biased social learning efffected by copying-the-best social learning to be even more susceptible to deleterious sampling efffects than predicted by our model.
Our most striking result is that smaller, but not too small, social cliques can-perhaps counterintuitively-promote the survival and spread of benefĳicial variants with copy-the-best learning strategies when payofff uncertainty is relatively high. As discussed in the introductory remarks, previous studies have demonstrated that cumulative cultural evolution requires a large enough population (Shennan 2001; Henrich 2004) or a high enough migration rate between subpopulations (Powell et al. 2009 ) to offfset losses due to drift and the low fĳidelity of social learning. However, we also noted that empirical evidence does not unambiguously support this expectation (Collard et al. 2013) , and our results suggest two possible reasons that increasing population size might not always be benefĳicial in the case of copy-the-best learning strategy. The results of our fĳirst experiment demonstrate that when there is payofff uncertainty increasing population size increases the probability of loss of a benefĳicial novel trait when it is very rare. To some extent this is the case for all three forms of social learning that we modeled, but it is most pronounced for the copy-the-best learning rule. Although our results also demonstrate that (unsurprisingly) the deleterious sampling efffect caused by the interaction between payofff uncertainty and population size can be offfset by high rates of convergent innovation, we note Henrich's (2004) fĳinding that harder-to-copy and/ or harder-to-innovate traits are most dependent on larger population sizes for their maintenance and/or further evolution. The results of our second and third experiments demonstrate that when payofff is uncertain the rate of cultural evolution resulting from copy-the-best social learning is not a monotonic function of sample pool size but is maximized by social learning within social cliques of intermediate size. This result is broadly consistent with a recent network analysis (Montanari and Saberi 2010) , which found that innovations spread faster in locally connected networks than in larger well-integrated social infrastructures. The deleterious efffect of larger sample pool sizes on the early stages of innovation suggests that the way in which social learners sample a population can be as important as, or even more important than, the variation in the overall census population size when payofff uncertainty is high. In fact, while it is true that increasing the census population can be expected to increase the rate of evolution if the sample pool size remains unchanged, when payofff uncertainty is high it may be possible to obtain an even higher rate of evolution by reducing the population size while simultaneously reducing the sample pool size (see Figure 4) . Consequently, it appears that when payofff uncertainty is high the subdivision of the census population into overlapping "cultural incubators" can increase the rate of cultural evolution as much as or more than simply increasing the population size. This cautions against predicting the rate of cumulative cultural evolution on the basis of population size alone. It also suggests (contra Powell et al. 2009 ) that increasing connectivity between subpopulations may not always increase the rate of cumulative cultural evolution.
Finally, we note that in some circumstances copy-the-best social learning is expected to produce a lower rate of cumulative cultural evolution than the less strongly directed copy-if-better learning rule. Our results demonstrate that when payofff uncertainty is low copy-the-best social learning leads to a higher rate of cultural evolution than either of the other learning rules, even as its effĳicacy declines with increasing sample pool size. However, as payofff uncertainty increases there comes a point where copy-if-better social learning outperforms copy-if-better learning for all except the very smallest sample pool sizes, because it is not subject to the deleterious sampling efffect that undermines copy-the-best learning as sample pool sizes increase. Empirical values for the sample pool size are difffĳicult to estimate, although we might expect that for most of human history it was comparatively small and close to our cognitive limits on the maintenance of stable social relationships (ca. 150; Dunbar 1993) . Consequently, for much of human history, copy-the-best social learning might have been more efffective than other social learning strategies despite its susceptibility to false inference in the face of payofff uncertainty. However, the situation might be diffferent today, since the exponential development of information technology over the last 50 years has greatly increased the pool of potential social models (k), quite possibly creating scenarios beyond those we modeled here. Any concomitant slowdown in cultural evolution might not be visible in absolute terms (since the rate of cultural evolution could still be increasing given the larger N), but we would expect the efffect of survivorship bias (and the consequent misevaluation of cultural traits) to become stronger, and the advantage of a copy-the-best social learning strategy to greatly decrease, relative to alternative social learning strategies in the presence of high payofff uncertainty. 
